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Abstract 
 
The paper sets an accounting and behavioral framework from which we derive a 
reduced-form equation to test income smoothing and capital management practices 
through loan loss provisions (PLL) by Spanish banks. Spain offers a unique environment to 
perform those tests because there are very detailed rules to set aside loan loss provisions 
and they are not counted as regulatory capital. Using panel data econometric techniques, 
we find evidence of income smoothing through PLL but not of capital management. The 
paper draws some lessons for accounting rule setters and banking regulators regarding 
the current changes in the accounting framework (introduction of IFRS/IAS in Europe) as well 
as the new capital framework (Basel II). In particular, a very detailed set of rules to set aside 
loan loss provisions does not prevent managers from decreasing earnings volatility, similarly 
to what happens in a more principles-oriented accounting framework. 
 
JEL: G18, G21. 
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1 Introduction 
Banks use loan loss provisions to create reserves in order to cover the expected (latent, 
inherent or incurred and not yet individually identified) losses embedded in their loan 
portfolios. In theory, the accrual of loan loss provisions in the income statement of banks 
should be exclusively dictated by credit risk considerations. But, in practice, loan loss 
provisions are, in many countries, left to the judgment of banks’ managers and, therefore, 
they are one of the important items of the income statement subject to discretionary 
managerial decisions [Beatie et al. (1995), World Bank (2002)]. Although the debate on 
whether earnings management by banks or any company contributes to market efficiency or 
distorts investors decisions in a non-efficient way is still open [Goel and Thakor (2003)], it is 
well understood that regulatory decisions alter the managerial incentives to perform such 
actions. 
The new accounting framework based on International Accounting Standards (IAS), 
renamed International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and the implementation of the 
new capital framework (Basel II) will significantly change the regulatory environment of 
European banks. The IFRS/IAS framework is a step forward in the direction of less detailed 
rules and more principles in the elaboration of accounting statements. The discussion on 
principles versus rules was fuelled by some large accounting scandals, as in Enron, where 
many argued that under a principles based system, the auditors would have been forced to 
evaluate the economic substance of Enron’s transactions rather than merely certify that the 
firm had complied with a series of detailed rules. Basel II will make capital requirements 
more risk sensitive. Moreover, Basel II raises the issue of the purpose of regulatory capital 
(i. e. if it should be used to cover unexpected or expected and unexpected losses) and, more 
specifically, the issue of whether loan loss reserves should be included or not as part of 
regulatory capital. Research on determinants of the current loan loss provisions decisions by 
banks in different regulatory environments can help evaluate the likely consequences of 
changes in the regulatory framework of banks in income smoothing and capital management 
practices. 
This paper examines the causes and consequences of the use of loan loss 
provisions to manage earnings and capital by banks with two main contributions. First, the 
paper explicitly models the process that determines the reduced-form equation used to test 
income smoothing and capital management. This provides theoretical foundations to some of 
the empirical specifications used in previous work, and helps to properly identify the 
explanatory variables used in the tests. It also provides direct comparisons of the incentives to 
smoothing in countries, including the US, where general loan loss reserves are currently 
included as part of tier 2 regulatory capital, and the case of Spain where provisions are 
excluded from capital. To our knowledge this is the first time that such formal comparison is 
performed. 
Second, the paper presents empirical evidence about the practice of income 
smoothing and capital management in Spain, where loan loss reserves are excluded 
from regulatory capital. Spanish banks will have different costs and benefits of managing 
profit and/or capital than, for example, US banks. Most of the existing evidence on use of 
loan loss provisions to manage income and capital refers to the US [Beaver et al. (1989); 
Moyer (1990); Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson (1990); Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995); 
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Collins, Shackelford and Wahlen (1995); Beaver and Engel (1996); Kim and Kross (1998); 
Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas (1999)]1. The comparison with what happens in a country with 
different regulatory regime can help to better anticipate the impact of future regulatory 
changes. 
In Spain the regulation of loan loss provisions is made by the Central Bank (Banco de 
España), which dictates strict rules on how such provisions have to be accrued and, 
in principle, it leaves little room for managerial discretion. If evidence is found that banks 
get away from strict accounting rules and use loan loss provision decisions to manage 
earnings or capital, then to have very detailed rules may be irrelevant, and there is a 
point in having more principles-oriented accounting standards. Likewise, in year 2000, the 
Banco de España introduced the so-called “statistical provision” aimed at, during good times, 
force banks to set aside provisions for the expected losses that are embedded in their 
expanding credit portfolios and, during bad times, allowing to use the reserve to cover 
realized losses [Fernández de Lis, Martínez and Saurina (2000)]. This is a very unique 
regulatory experience since it introduces a countercyclical loan loss provision that, by 
construction, smoothes net income over time. Our behavioral model predicts that, under 
income smoothing, general and specific loan loss provisions should be more dependent 
on the true credit risk of loans and less dependent on net operating income after the 
statistical provision was introduced than what they were before. The paper provides an 
empirical test of this prediction. 
Besides the interest of the research questions and the fact that we provide evidence 
on important issues from a different accounting and banking regulatory framework 
than previous work, the paper contributes to the literature on positive accounting and 
bank regulation around loan loss provision decisions in other ways. First, the estimation of 
the empirical model is made with the appropriate panel data techniques to control for 
endogeneity or simultaneity of some of the explanatory variables (i .e. instrumental variables 
and, in particular, GMM estimators), as well as for potential biases due to the correlation 
between explanatory variables and regression residuals. Such estimation techniques, as in 
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) that apply them to non-financial firms, prove very relevant 
to avoid biases in the estimations. Secondly, thanks to the theoretical analysis, the paper 
points out that lagged regulatory capital, beginning of the year, and not contemporary capital, 
end of the year, as most of the papers have used in the past, is the proper explanatory 
variable to use in models that test capital management. Loan loss provisions of period t 
affect the retained earnings of period t and, therefore, the capital of the bank at the end of 
the year. This can create spurious correlation that distorts the results of the tests. 
Using bank level annual data for the period 1986 to 2002 we find robust evidence 
that, despite the detailed set of rules for loan loss provisions and the exclusion of general 
provisions from regulatory capital, there has been income smoothing among Spanish banks. 
Therefore, a detailed set of rules for provisioning does not curtail managers’ discretion 
and, thus, the final result is not too far away from that obtained in an accounting framework 
governed by principles that allow, in general, for more discretion. Secondly, no evidence is 
found of capital management in the sense that Spanish banks do not condition the loan 
loss provision decision to the level of the regulatory capital at the beginning of the period. 
                                                                          
1. Some exceptions would be Shrieves and Dahl (2003) who study the case of Japanese banks and Laeven 
and Majnoni (2003) who analyze loan loss provision decisions in a sample of several countries. Anandarajan, 
Hasan and Lozano-Vivas (2003) study the Spanish case although the sample period (1986-1995), the hypotheses and 
the econometric approach (OLS) are quite different from those we present in this paper. 
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Thus, there is a separation between loan loss provisions and capital. Finally, evidence is 
found that the statistical provision is in fact an income smoothing device so that, after 
its introduction in year 2000, Spanish banks set their non statistical provisions (general and 
specific) with higher weight in credit risk variables and less weight in net operating income, 
than in years before. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief summary 
of the regulation of loan loss provisions and reserves in Spain and the regulatory framework 
that is introduced by IFRS/IAS and Basel II. Section 3 presents the basic models that relate 
loan loss provisions with net operating income and capital under different behavioral 
assumptions on earnings and capital management. Section 4 explains the econometric 
framework used to test income smoothing and capital management as well as the database. 
In section 5 we present the results of the empirical analysis. The discussion of the results, 
section 6, and the conclusions, section 7, closes the paper. 
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2 The accounting and regulatory frameworks 
One important risk for banks is credit risk. Banks use loan loss provisions to create 
reserves in order to cover the expected losses embedded in their loan portfolios. In many 
countries, including the US, the amount of specific and general loan loss provisions is left 
to managers’ judgement. However, in a few countries, Spain among them, the loan loss 
provisions are subject to very detailed rules and, in principle, managers have little discretion 
to alter them [Beattie et al. (1995), World Bank (2002)]. 
Loan loss provisions might be counted as regulatory bank capital. In the US, 
as well as in other countries (I e. G-10 countries), general loan loss reserves are included as 
part of Tier 2 regulatory capital. Basel I, the current capital framework, considers that general 
loan loss reserves are tier 2 capital up to 1.25% of risk-weighted assets. Therefore, bank 
managers might have incentives to use loan loss provisions to alter regulatory capital ratios. 
However, in Spain they are not counted either as tier 1 or tier 2 capital. National banking 
supervisors can tighten Basel rules and that has been the case for Spain regarding loan loss 
provisions. 
Basel II [BCBS (2004)] advocates for some changes in the definition of capital. 
The final framework states that for those banks using the IRB approach (i. e. the approach 
that allows for the use of the own risk measurement from the internal models of the banks), 
expected losses should be fully covered with all loan loss provisions and that, in case 
of shortfall it is deducted 50% from tier 1 and 50% from tier 2. The excess provision 
over expected losses can be recognized as tier 2, up to 0.6% of the risk-weighted assets. 
Banks in the standardised approach (i. e. an extension of the current Basel I capital 
requirements to incorporate rating agencies assessment of the riskiness of exposures) 
will apply the current 1.25% risk-weighted-assets approach. In the Basel II final framework 
capital aims at covering unexpected losses whilst loan loss provisions are devoted to 
expected losses. Thus, the purpose and definition of bank regulatory capital has been open 
to discussion, and in particular the role played by loan loss provisions. 
The question is whether detailed rules can effectively limit management discretion 
in decisions such as how much loan loss provisions accrue in the income statement of 
the bank, and to what extent the incentives and the impact of bank managers’ discretion 
depends on the aim and definition of regulatory capital. Although with some mixed results, 
there are plenty of references in the literature of accounting and finance showing that, in fact, 
managers use loan loss provisions to “manage” earnings and/or capital2. Those that view 
earnings management as a practice that disguises the true economic value of firms and 
sends distorted signals to the investors and any stakeholder of the company, would express 
their concerns if accounting reforms and the change in the regulatory capital framework spur 
more discretion in managerial decisions with respect to loan loss provisions. 
Spain is a unique environment to test income smoothing and capital management 
and, thus, to answer the question set in the former paragraph since there are very 
detailed rules for setting aside loan loss provisions and, moreover, they are not counted as 
regulatory capital. Regarding the specific provision, for impaired loans (i. e. 90 days overdue) 
                                                                          
2. See, for example, Beaver and Engel (1996), Moyer (1990), Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995), Ahmed, Takeda 
and Thomas (1999), Kim and Kross (1998). 
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between 3 and 6 months overdue, the provision was 10% of the current amount 
overdue; between 6 and 12 months, 25%; between 12 and 18 months 50%; between 18 
and 21 months, 75%; and for those more than 21 months overdue, 100%. Specific 
provisions for impaired mortgages (loan to value up to 80%) were different (up till 3 years 
past due, there was no provision requirement; between 3 and 4 years, 25%; between 4 
and 5 years, 50%; between 5 and 6 years, 75%; and 100% for those past due 6 years). 
If a loan had been in arrears for one year, the provision was applied to the whole amount 
due, not only to the installments overdue. Moreover, if the 25% of the due amount was 
overdue, the whole outstanding amount of the loan had to be used in order to calculate 
the specific provision for that loan. In addition, there were thresholds and linkages between 
several facilities that were pertaining to the same customer in order to determine the final 
coverage. For example, if a borrower had several loans from a bank, when the overdue 
amount reached the 25% of the total due amount of the borrower, the specific provision had 
to be set aside based on that whole amount, and not only on the overdue loans. Regarding 
general provisions, they were set either at the 1% of new loans (unimpaired) or at the 0.5% for 
(unimpaired) mortgages (with LTV up to 80%). 
The former prescriptive rules are in sharp contrast with the discretion that bank 
managers enjoy in many other countries. On top of that, Spain is also known for being the 
only country that has developed and started to apply (from July 2000 onwards) a dynamic 
provision (the so-called statistical provision). A detailed explanation of its rational, objectives 
and mechanism is in Fernandez de Lis, Martínez and Saurina (2000)3. Essentially, during 
good times, Spanish banks have to set aside provisions for the expected losses that are 
embedded in expanding credit portfolios. The provisions made during those years are used to 
build up the socalled statistical fund that might be depleted in bad times when the excesses 
of the last upturn appear in the form of impaired assets. The former is achieved by comparing 
every quarter the latent loss in the credit portfolio (i. e. a fixed parameter times the exposure) 
with the amount of specific provisions (which fluctuates significantly along the business cycle). 
That difference, if positive, is charged into the P&L whereas, if negative, is written as income 
in the P&L statement (provided that the statistical reserve has been previously build up). 
By design, the dynamic provision produces flat loan loss provision ratios (i. e. loan 
loss provisions over total loans) through the economic cycle. It might be of interest to see if 
such a provision, with a clear stated objective and a transparent mechanism (i. e. banks must 
disclose separately the amount of the statistical provision), has altered the behavior of 
Spanish banks in terms of income and earnings management. As Laeven and Majnoni (2003) 
indicate, the regulation of bank capital and loan loss reserves has to consider the incentives of 
banks to take into account macroeconomic shocks, together with the idiosyncratic ones in 
their loan loss provision decisions. This paper is interested in investigating if differences in loan 
loss provisions regulations and changes in regulation over time within a country affect the 
incentives of banks to manage income and capital. The next section presents the behavioral 
background that will guide the empirical analysis. 
                                                                          
3. Laeven and Majnoni (2003) link this provision with the cyclical oscillations of bank reserves proposed by Holmstrom 
and Tirole (2000). 
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3 Earnings and capital management 
We start with models that link loan loss provision decisions to income smoothing objectives 
and the indirect implications for the evolution of regulatory capital over time. Next, we model 
the loan loss provision decision if banks have additional purposes in terms of meeting 
regulatory capital standards. Finally, we model the implications for income smoothing of 
introducing the statistical provision. 
3.1 Earnings management 
One of the primary objectives of earnings management (accounting practices that depart 
consciously from established accounting rules and principles in the computation of 
accounting profits) is income smoothing, a practice aimed at reducing the variability of net 
profits over time. During good years managers use some discretionary items in the profit 
and loss account in order to decrease the amount of profits. During bad times, those funds 
can be used to prop up the bottom line. 
The existing literature provides several explanations about why firms smooth 
earnings. Barnea, Ronen and Sadan (1975) and Ronen and Sadan (1981) consider 
smoothing a signaling device; Beaver et al. (1989), Whalen (1994), Ahmed, Takeda and 
Thomas (1999) apply this idea to explain loan loss provisions decisions of US banks. 
Moral hazard and agency theory explanations of smoothing earnings can be found in 
Lambert (1984), multiperiod agency, and in Fudemberg and Tirole (1995)4. Trueman 
and Titman (1988) attribute income smoothing to perceived bankruptcy concerns and 
Rozycki (1997) to ways to take advantage of the tax code. For Goel and Thakor (2003) 
smoothing is the consequence of managers trying to increase share prices by reducing the 
potential loss that shareholders face when they trade for liquidity reasons. 
Banks may practice income smoothing because they are affected by some of 
the situations listed above but also for other reasons specific to the banking firm. Banks 
are subject to minimum capital requirements and income smoothing can be the result 
of accounting practices aimed at meeting these requirements. Moreover, at least in many 
countries, bank managers have high discretion in determining the amount of loan loss 
provisions to accrue in the income statement of the period, so loan loss provisions offer 
a unique opportunity for income smoothing among banks, [Kim and Santomero (1993), 
Wall and Kock (2000)]. 
The purpose of this section of the paper is to draw behavioral implications of income 
smoothing with loan loss provision decisions when they respond to general reasons and 
when they respond to capital management purposes in particular. 
Define by PLLt = f(CRt) the provision for loan losses that should be accrued 
by the bank in period t as a function of the credit risk of the portfolio (CR) and as a 
function of the regulatory rules on loan loss provisions. Define CPLLt as the actual or 
current provision charged by the bank in period t5, PT as the actual profit of the bank and  
PAt = (NOIt – PLLt)(1-u) the actual profit of the bank in case the provision for loan losses 
                                                                          
4. The agency framework is also present in Dye (1988), Schipper (1989) and Evans and Sridhar (1996). 
5. The CPLL are the Spanish equivalent to the provision for loan and leases losses (PLLL) in the US accounting 
framework. 
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responds only to credit risk considerations, where NOIt is the net operating income 
(before loan loss provisions), also in period t, and, finally, u is the tax rate on profits. We say 
that current provisions on loan losses obey to income smoothing when the difference 
between  CPLLt   and PLLt can be explained by the difference between the profit target of 
the bank PT and the actual profit, PAt. Formally, the income smoothing practice will explain 
provisions on loan losses when, 
 ( )ttt PAPTPLLCPLL −−=− 1β  (1) 
with β1 > 0 being the parameter that determines the speed of adjustment towards the profit 
target. The adjustment will be positive (negative) when non-smoothed profit is above (below) 
the profit target. Substituting PAt and PLLt for their respective values defined above and after 
rearranging the terms we have, 
 
ttt NOICRfCPLL 210 ααα ++= )(  (2) 
where PT10 βα −=  ; )( u−−= 11 11 βα  ; )( u−= 112 βα  
The use of loan loss provisions for income smoothing purposes implies that the 
current provision will be a linear combination of the provision determined only by credit 
risk considerations and of the net operating income of the period. 
Although it may not intend to do so, income smoothing will also affect the evolution 
of capital of the bank through its effect on the flow of retained earnings, REt. To see this, 
we calculate the RE of the bank in period t for a given dividend payment of DIVt: 
 ( ) tttt DIVuCPLLNOIRE −−−= )(1  (3) 
Substituting (2) in (3), we obtain: 
 ( ) ( )( ) tttt DIVNOIuCRfuuRE −−−+−−−−= 210 1111 ααα )()(  (4) 
Retained earnings will change with net operating income, NOI, by a factor of (1-u) 
if the bank does not practice income smoothing, (i. e. β1 = α2 = 0), and with a factor 
of (1-u)(1-α2) if there is income smoothing. Given that α2 > 0 (since β1 > 0), income smoothing 
weakens the relationship between NOI and retained earnings (tier 1 capital) over time. In other 
words, income smoothing reduces the contribution of profits to regulatory capital by an 
amount, per unit of profits, of (1-u)α2 compared with the contribution with no income 
smoothing of (1-u). 
In the Spanish case loan loss reserves are excluded from regulatory capital. 
However, given that Basel I allow to do so, in the US, as well as in many other 
countries, general loan loss reserves are counted as tier 2 capital (up to a limit). Now, 
the change in regulatory capital of period t will be the result of earnings retention and 
general loan loss provisions also in period t. Let χ (between 0 and 1) be the proportion of 
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general loan loss provisions over total provisions, that is, general and specific6. Changes in 
regulatory capital from increases in reserves and provisions during period t will be, 
( ) tttttt CPLLDIVuCPLLuNOICPLLRE χχ +−−−−=+ )(11  (5) 
Substituting (2) in (5), we have: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )0 1 21 1 ( ) 1 1t t t t tRE CPLL u u f CR u u NOI DIVχ α χ χ α χ α+ = − + + − + + − + − + −  (6) 
Now, a marginal change in net operating income, NOI, will imply a change 
in regulatory capital, tier 1 + tier 2, of [1-u + (χ-1+u)α2] = [1-u - (1-u-χ)α2]. When loan 
loss provisions are part of the regulatory capital, income smoothing lowers the marginal 
contribution of NOI to capital in the amount of (1-u-χ)α2, compared with the 
marginal contribution with no income smoothing of (1-u). Notice that if χ is larger than (1-u) 
income smoothing actually increases the marginal contribution of NOI to capital, compared 
with the contribution with no income smoothing7. When general loan loss provisions are 
excluded as part of regulatory capital, income smoothing lowers the marginal contribution 
of net operating income to capital, compared with the contribution when they are 
included, by an amount of χα2. However, excluding loan loss provisions from regulatory 
capital increases the fixed component of retained earning resulting from income 
smoothing, compared with that when they are included, by the amount PT10 χβα = . 
The final conclusion is that the effect of income smoothing on the level of regulatory capital 
from changes in the regulation on loan loss reserves being part of regulatory capital or not, is 
undetermined Importantly, if there is no income smoothing, α2 = 0, the definition of regulatory 
capital is irrelevant in terms of the impact of the evolution of NOI on bank regulatory capital. 
 We summarize the results on income smoothing as follows: 
Result 1.a) The use of loan loss provisions to smooth earnings implies that current 
loan loss provisions will be determined by a linear combination of credit risk factors and of 
net operating income of the period. 
1.b) Banks that use loan loss provisions to smooth earnings weaken the relation 
between net operating income and regulatory capital, compared with the situation with 
no smoothing. The cost of income smoothing, in terms of lower contribution to regulatory 
capital through retained earnings, when loan loss reserves are included as part of 
regulatory capital compared with that when they are excluded, is undetermined. 
1.c) If there is no income smoothing, the impact of net operating income on capital 
through retained earnings is the same regardless of the definition of bank regulatory 
capital (i. e. in the US and in Spain). 
These results have an important corollary. If banks care about the induced effects of 
income smoothing in the evolution of regulatory capital over time, we cannot be sure of the 
                                                                          
6. Indirectly, assuming χ constant means that it is independent of the extent to which the bank engages in income 
smoothing. 
7. If we consider only tier 1, then income smoothing has the same cost in terms of reduced retained earnings when 
loan loss reserves are not part of tier 2 capital than when they are. Here we assume that the relevant regulatory capital 
is tier 1 plus tier 2. 
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net costs of income smoothing in terms of the contribution of retained earnings to regulatory 
capital of  one regulatory capital regime or the other. 
3.2 Capital management 
The reasons why banks hold capital are manifold [Berger, Herring and Szegö (1995)]. 
Holding capital reduces the probability of bankruptcy and therefore the so-called costs of 
failure, which include the loss of charter value, reputation loss, compliance with existing 
compulsory capital requirements and legal costs of the bankruptcy process [Acharya (1996)]. 
Higher capital levels reduce the probability of not complying with those requirements 
thus minimizing the consequent costs (restrictions on the current activities of the bank, 
on the future growth prospects, on the payment of dividends or immediate capitalization). 
Changing the capital level entails adjustment costs. Apart from pure transaction costs, the 
main adjustment costs include those related to the problem of asymmetric information in 
capital markets. As the issuer has an informational advantage over the potential buyers, 
issuing stocks can be seen as a signal that the company considers that market prices 
are above the true share value, which would increase the cost of the desired adjustment 
[Myers and Majluf (1984) and Winter (1994)]. 
The effect of income smoothing on regulatory capital, as shown in the previous 
subsection, may force banks to condition smoothing to meeting capital requirements. On the 
other hand, banks can use loan loss provision decisions to manage regulatory capital directly. 
Define by C* the target in regulatory capital set by the bank to comply with minimum 
capital requirements and by Ct the regulatory capital of the bank at the end of the period 
if there is no smoothing and loan loss provisions are determined exclusively as a function of 
credit risk. In the Spanish case, once the dividend policy is fixed, banks can only change the 
regulatory capital through retained earnings. To use loan loss provisions to manage capital 
means, in this context, that banks decide the current loan loss provision of the period so that 
retained earnings contribute to reduce the distance between the target and the level 
of regulatory capital resulting from no management decisions,  
)*()()( ttt CCPLLRECPLLRE −=− 2β  (7) 
with  β2 > 0. 
Given that RE(CPLLt) = (NOIt – CPLLt)(1-u) – DIVt; RE(PLLt) = (NOIt-PLLt)(1-u) – 
DIVt; PLLt = f(CRt); and Ct = (Ct-1+(1-u)(NOIt – PLLt)-DIVt), we obtain from (7),  
12222 111 −+−+−−++−= ttttt CNOIuCRfuDIVCCPLL ββββ )()())(()*(  (8) 
Capital management in the way described implies that current loan loss provisions 
are determined as the weighted sum of credit risk factors [f(CRt)], net operating income of the 
period (NOIt) and regulatory capital at the beginning of the period (Ct-1). 
If capital regulation of banks includes general loan loss reserves as part of the 
regulatory capital, banks can use retained earnings together with loan loss provisions to meet 
capital objectives. If CL indicates capital plus general loan loss reserves, we can write,  
( ) ( ) ( )ttttt CLCLPLLPLLRECPLLCPLLRE −=+−+ *)()( 2βχχ  (9) 
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and substituting in (9) RE(CPLLt) and RE(PLLt) by their values given above, we have, 
1
22
2
2
11
11
1 −−−+−−
−+−++−−
−= ttttt CLuNOIu
uCRfDIVCL
u
CPLL χ
β
χ
ββχ
β )(
)()()*(  (10) 
The sign of (1-u-χ) can be positive or negative and the absolute value of 1/(1-u-χ) 
is greater than 1. Therefore, when loan loss provisions are part of regulatory capital, capital 
management implies indeterminacy in the sign of the association between current loan 
loss provisions and net operating income and regulatory capital. When the proportion of 
general over total provisions is high, χ > (1-u), the association between beginning of the 
period capital and current loan loss provisions will be negative under capital management. 
Usually, specific provisions are relatively larger in economic downturns, when impaired loans 
(i. e. past due and doubtful assets) increase substantially. During upturns, general provisions 
are more prevalent. Therefore, under regulatory regimes that include general provisions in 
regulatory capital the use of loan loss provisions to manage capital will imply a positive 
association between current loan loss provisions and beginning of the period capital in 
economic downturns and a negative association between the two in upturns8. 
Result 2.a) If banks use loan loss provisions to manage capital then current total 
loan loss provisions will be positively correlated with beginning of the period regulatory 
capital in regulatory regimes where loan loss reserves are excluded from regulatory capital. 
2.b) On the other hand, when general loan loss reserves are included as part 
of the regulatory capital, capital management implies a positive (negative) association 
between the two variables when the proportion of general reserves over total reserves is 
lower (higher) than one minus the tax rate. 
2.c) Capital management through loan loss provisions implies that current loan loss 
provisions will be a function of net operating income even in cases where there is no earnings 
management. The sign of the association is the same that the sign of the association 
between current provisions and start of the period regulatory capital but the absolute value of 
the association will be lower by a factor of (1-u). 
3.3 Statistical provision 
In this section we explore the implications, for the behavioral models of loan loss provisions 
outlined above, of the statistical provision which was described in more detail in section 2. 
Let SPt be the statistical provision that a bank accrues in period t. This provision 
increases in periods of higher relative credit growth, economic expansions, and it 
decreases in periods of low growth, recessions, when general and specific provisions are 
not sufficient to cover the increase in bad loans due to defaults. Therefore, the statistical 
provision is in itself counter-cyclical and contributes to smooth profits over the business cycle. 
                                                                          
8. Moyer (1990) points out that when loan loss reserves are part of regulatory capital a dollar increase in loan loss 
provisions increases regulatory capital by the tax rate. Therefore, the relationship between current loan loss provisions 
and regulatory capital at the beginning of the year will be negative. Our model differs from this result because, consistent 
with Basel I regulation on capital, we make the distinction between general and specific provisions and only the later can 
be part of tier 2 capital. Our model is consistent with the prediction of a negative association between total loan loss 
provisions and regulatory capital when χ = 1. In this case the coefficient χ
β
−−u1
2  will be -β2/u, consistent with Moyer’s 
result. Thus, the presentation above is consistent with current Basel I capital regulation that limits the inclusion in tier 2 
capital to general loan loss reserves. 
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Our interest is to study how the statistical provision modifies the decisions on the accrual of 
general and specific provisions (CPLL) by Spanish banks. 
Equation (1) is now formulated as:  
)'PAPT(PLLCPLL ttt −−=− 3β  (11) 
where PT  is the (unchanged) profit target after the new provision and 'PA  is the profit 
level under the assumption that there is no smoothing and net of the statistical 
provision, tttt SPuPLLNOIPA −−−= ))((' 1 , since the statistical provision is not tax 
deductible. The profit target is assumed the same since the expected impact of the statistical 
provision is zero across an entire business cycle. 
The statistical provision is calculated as the difference between the proportion k of 
the total loans at the end of the period, Lt, and the specific provision accrued by the bank 
under no smoothing, SPt = kLt – (1- χ) PLLt. 
Substituting SPt and 'PA  in (11) we have, 
tttt kLNOI)u()CR(f))u((PTCPLL 3333 11 ββχββ −−++−−+−=  (12) 
Under income smoothing, the introduction of the statistical provision implies that 
banks set generic and specific loan loss provisions (CPLLt) as a function (positive) of NOI 
and as a function (negative) of the stock of loans L. Since both, net operating income and 
loans, are variables that capture the volume of activity of the bank, the positive and negative 
signs of their respective coefficients will tend to net out. Loan loss provisions will now depend 
relatively more of the credit risk, the coefficient of f(CRt) is higher than before the statistical 
provision by an amount equal to β3 (1-χ), and less on the cyclical activity of the bank. In fact, 
assuming that net operating income, NOI, is proportional to total loans, L, by a factor of m, 
NOI = mL, then (12) can be written as, 
 
ttt NOI)m
ku()CR(f))u((PTCPLL −−++−−+−= 11 333 βχββ  (13) 
Therefore, we have the following result. 
Result 3. If banks smooth income, the introduction of the statistical provision 
lowers the weight of the NOI variable in determining the current general and specific 
provisions accrued by each bank, and increases the weight of credit risk variables when 
the proportion of general reserves χ is less than one9. 
 
                                                                          
9. For given values of the parameters u, k and m the sign of the weight placed in the NOI variable can even be negative. 
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4 Econometric model and data set 
The empirical model assumes that banks decide about specific and general provisions, 
CPLL, with the purposes of covering credit risk, smoothing income and possibly managing 
capital. From equation (10) above the general empirical model is formulated as follows:  
itiititit VariablesControlCNOIRISKCREDITfCPLL εηµγβδα ++++++= −1)(  (14) 
Where α, δ, β, γ, µ are are parameters to be estimated. The null hypothesis is 
that β and γ are equal to zero (i. e. banks do not use loan loss provisions to manage 
profits and/or capital). These hypotheses are made under the premise that, in Spain, loan 
loss provisions are highly regulated through detailed rules and, thus, there is no discretion for 
bank managers in deciding about them. 
Equation (14) resembles the empirical model used in the literature either to test for 
income smoothing, to test for capital management, or both. Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988), 
Ma (1988) and Wetmore and Brick (1994) all regress loan loss provisions on current net 
operating income, non-performing loan ratios and some additional variables as credit 
portfolio structure. The empirical literature on banks usually analyses both income 
smoothing and capital management at the same time. Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas (1999) 
regresses loan loss provisions on earnings before provisions and tier 1 capital before 
loan loss reserves. A similar equation and explanatory variables are used in Beatty, 
Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995), Collins, Shackelford and Wahlen (1995) and Moyer (1990), 
although as a part of a multiple equation framework where other discretionary items are also 
considered. Wahlen (1994) and Kim and Kross (1998) focus only on loan loss provisions and 
charge-offs simultaneously10. Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988); Ma (1988); Scholes, Wilson 
and Wolfson (1990); Whalen (1994); Collins Shackelford and Wahlen (1995); and Kim and 
Kross (1998) find evidence on income smoothing with loan loss provisions whilst 
Wetmore and Brick (1994), and Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas (1999) reject it. For the US 
regulatory framework, capital management might also imply γ < 0 when the proportion of 
general provisions is high, as we showed before. Moyer (1990), Beatty, Chamberlain and 
Magliolo (1995) and Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas (1999) find evidence of a negative 
relationship between capital and loan loss provisions for US banks. Kim and Kross (1998) find 
evidence of capital management in low capitalized banks. 
Once the credit risk and control variables are made explicit the empirical model to be 
estimated is formulated as follows: 
 
itiitititit
tittitit
SIZECAPREGNOINOI
GDPGLTAIBOLNPLCCPLL
εηµγββ
δδδδ
++++×++
+++++=
−121
4321
00
 (15) 
                                                                          
10. Beaver et al. (1989); Wahlen (1994); Beaver and Engel (1996) and Liu, Ryan and Wahlen (1997) focus on the 
impact of loan loss provisions on the market value of the banks, distinguishing between the discretionary and 
the non-discretionary components of PLL. 
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The dependent variable CPLLit is the value of net specific and general loan loss 
provisions of bank i in year t. The variable is normalised by the total assets of the bank to 
avoid spurious size effects in the explanation of provisions. 
The variables that proxy the credit risk of the bank, CR, are NPL, IBOL, LTA 
and GDPD. The variable NPL measures the doubtful assets of bank i in period t, according to 
its balance sheet data; the variable is normalised by the total assets of the bank. IBOL is the 
general index of stocks listed in the Madrid Stock exchange also in year t; it is intended to 
capture expectations about future economic conditions which can affect the current loan 
loss provision decisions of banks. LTA, the ratio of total loans to total assets, is a proxy for the 
risk profile of the bank. The more loans to the retail or the corporate sector, the higher the risk 
tolerance of bank managers (the alternative is to buy far safer Spanish government bonds or 
to lend to other Spanish banks). GDPG is the rate of growth of Spanish Gross Domestic 
Product in year t. It is intended to capture the effect of macroeconomic conditions (business 
cycle) on loan loss provisions, beyond the risk profile of a particular bank. The inclusion of 
an explicit measure of the business cycle offers us the possibility of testing the cyclical 
pattern of CPLL, when controlling for other explanatory variables. The strong cyclical pattern 
of loan loss provisions was one of the prudential arguments used by Banco de España to 
create he statistical provision11, coupled with the well known fact that credit risk mistakes are 
made during good times when over optimism is pervasive and credit standards are relaxed 
[Crockett (1997), Rajan (1994), Manove and Padilla (1999), and Jiménez and Saurina (2006)]. 
Coefficients of NPL and LTA are expected to be positive and those of IBOL and GDPG 
negative. 
The variable NOI is the net operating income (profits before provisions and 
extraordinary items) of bank i in period t, normalised by total assets of the bank. Earnings 
and/or capital management practices predict a positive and significant value for the coefficient 
of this explanatory variable (Results 1.a and 2.c). The cross effect variable NOI x REG00, 
where REG00 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the observation belongs to 
the period before year 2000 and 0 otherwise, allows for changes in the weight of NOI 
variable after the statistical provision is introduced. The model predicts a negative sign for 
the oefficient of this variable, i. e. the statistical provision reduces the weight of NOI in the 
determination of general and specific provisions (Result 3). 
The variable CAP is the total capital ratio of the bank at the start of period t 
(end of period t-1). The numerator does not include the general loan loss provision and 
the denominator is the risk-weighted assets (RWA). Capital management practices that under 
Spanish regulation exclude loan loss provisions from regulatory capital imply a positive 
coefficient for this variable12. 
The variable SIZE is the log of total assets. It is included as a control variable. We do 
not have any strong13 a priori about the expected sign, although credit portfolio diversification 
would point towards a negative sign for μ. 
                                                                          
11. Laeven and Majnoni (2003) are also interested in testing the cyclical pattern of loan loss provisions. More 
generally, during Basel II discussions, the issue of procyclicality of capital requirements has risen a lot of attention. 
Taylor and Goodhart (2004) contains a good summary of that discussion as well as many references. Notice 
that procyclicality of loan loss provisions would increase additionally the pressure on bank capital during bad times. 
12. Some papers test for capital management using unweighted total assets due to the lack of data on RWA. 
13. Hughes et al. (1996) explain the advantages and disadvantages of diversification in terms of risk. 
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Finally, ηi reflects unobserved bank individual characteristics that are constant 
along time. Among those characteristics, it should be included the bank risk profile. 
Credit policies are not changed from one day to the other. Usually, they are deeply 
established and permeate the whole banking organisation. Therefore, it is possible to assign 
to each bank a kind of characteristic risk profile that defines its particular way to manage 
credit risk. εit is the random error. 
Model (15) is estimated with the DPD package developed by Arellanao and 
Bond (1988). Variables are in differences to control for unobserved bank individual effects. 
Since CPLL and some of the explanatory variables, NPL, NOI, LTA, CAP, can be jointly 
determined we make use of the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator for NPL, LTA, CAP 
and NOI using as instruments two and three-year lags of these four variables. 
The data come from accounting statements of consolidated banking groups 
from 1986 till 2002. The time period covers almost two full business cycles in Spain. 
We focus on consolidated data because capital requirements are calculated at a group 
level, irrespective that each individual bank has to have satisfactory available capital. 
Both commercial and savings banks have been included, representing more than 95% 
of total market share of credit institutions. Only foreign bank branches and credit 
co-operatives have been excluded. Our panel is unbalanced since new institutions have 
started to operate during the period considered while others have ceased to exist. 
Under these premises and after eliminating a series of institutions with extremely 
atypical data (due essentially to the specific nature of their business), an unbalanced panel 
has been obtained comprising up to 142 banks over a period of up to 17 years, totaling 1449 
observations. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables. 
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5 Results 
Model 1 of Table 2 contains the results of the estimation of equation (15) in first differences. 
The results are the one-step estimates robust to heteroskedasticity provided by DPD. 
As expected, there is autocorrelation of first order but not of second order (through 
differentiation we have created artificially autocorrelation of first order in the residuals). 
The test of adequacy of instruments (Sargan test) is also satisfactory. 
The coefficients of the credit risk proxy variables all have the expected sign. The 
coefficient of non-performing loans over total assts, NPL, is positive and significant at the 1% 
level. Similar results are obtained for the coefficient of loans over total assets, LTA, positive 
and significant. IBOL and GDPD have negative estimated coefficients but only the coefficient 
of the GDP growth variable is statistically significant at 5%. Expectations from the Stock 
market do not affect current loan loss provision decisions of banks, after controlling for the 
rest of the variables. On the other hand, the business cycle affects loan loss provision 
decisions of banks, in a countercyclical way, even after controlling for the bank level risk 
variables, such as NPL and LTA. The control variable SIZE does not have a significant effect 
on loan loss provisions. 
The positive and significant coefficient of NOI does not reject the hypothesis 
that Spanish banks practice income smoothing through their loan loss provision 
decisions (Result 1.a). However, the negative and significant coefficient of NOIxREG00 
implies that smoothing is less important in determining the general and specific loan loss 
provisions after year 2000, when the statistical provision is in place. This confirms Result 3 
and indicates that the statistical provision provides banks with a smoothing device that 
substitutes old smoothing practices through general and specific provisions. Model 2 
shows the results when the estimation is restricted to the period 1989-1999, when 
the statistical provision was not in place. The coefficient of NOI is the same as that shown 
in Model 1 for the period 1989-2002 (0.166 and 0.169, respectively). From Model 1 the 
coefficient of NOI in the period 2000-2002 is 0.075 (0.169-0.094), less than halve the value in 
the previous period14. 
On the other hand, the parameter of the total capital ratio lagged one-year, CAP, is 
not significantly different from zero. This is true in Model 1 and in Model 2. Therefore, there 
is no evidence of capital management through loan loss provisions in Spain (Result 2.a is 
rejected). The result is robust to alternative measures of capital, tier 1 (CAPT1) in Model 3 and 
capital buffer (BUF) in Model 4 in Table 215. Importantly, the income smoothing results 
continue to hold when we use the alternative definitions for the capital variable. 
A relevant issue is to test if the smoothing behaviour is symmetric in periods of 
expansion and contraction. Model 5 of Table 2 presents evidence in this respect by allowing 
                                                                          
14. Note that in Model 2 the coefficient of NPL is lower than in Model 1 (0.116 compared to 0.127). This is consistent 
with Result 3 that predicts an increase in the weight of risk factors in determining loan loss provisions after 
the statistical provision. However, when we estimate the model with REG00xNPL as an additional explanatory 
variable then the coefficient of this variable is not statistically different from zero. During the high GDP growth period 
of 2000-2002 the proportion of general loan loss provisions is quite high. 
15. The capital buffer is calculated as the difference between the current regulatory capital held by the bank and 
its minimum required capital, in terms of the latter one. A detailed discussion of the determinants of that buffer is in 
Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina (2004). 
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changes in the parameter of NOI in periods when current profits before provisions are above 
the long term value of profits (average value of NOI over the period for each) and when 
current profits are below the long term value. The positive coefficient of the variable 
)( iit NOINOIABS − , although only significant at the 14% level, indicates that banks seem 
to increase the discretion on loan loss provisions relative to earnings in periods where profits 
are relatively high, while in periods when profits are relatively low the effect decreases 
significantly. 
5.1 Robustness analysis 
Model 1 of Table 3 contains the estimation of equation (15) augmented by including the 
endogenous variable lagged one period as an explanatory variable. As mentioned in 
section 2, specific provisions evolve in Spain according to a calendar linked to the past due 
age of the non-performing loans. Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that today’s loan 
loss provisions will be highly correlated to those of last year. To have the lagged endogenous 
variable in the right hand side obliges us to use an additional GMM estimator for that variable. 
It is instrumented with two and three lags. 
As in Model 1 of Table 2, there is residual autocorrelation of first order and not of 
the second order. The Sargan test is satisfactory. As expected, the lagged endogenous 
variable is positive and significant. Regarding the other variables, there is almost no change. 
NPL and LTA have positive and significant estimated coefficients. The strong cyclicality of 
provisions remains, although now is only significant at the 10% level. Expectations from 
the Stock market are not significant, as before. More importantly, the lack of capital 
management hypothesis holds as well as the non-rejection of the income smoothing one. 
Model 2 in Table 3 shows the result of the estimation of (15) using the 
contemporaneous capital ratio instead of the lagged one year capital ratio16. In that case, 
all the former results hold. However, the parameter of the capital ratio is now negative and 
statistically significant. Recall that in Spain, given that general loan loss provisions are not 
counted as tier 2, the expected sign for the capital ratio under capital management is 
positive and the proper capital measure to use is the capital ratio lagged one year, not the 
end of the year value. Our interpretation of the negative coefficient of the contemporaneous 
capital ratio is that the ratio is determined after the loan loss provisions of the period are 
accrued in the income statement. Higher loan loss provisions imply lower retained earnings in 
the period and lower capital at the end of the period. Therefore the negative sign is spurious 
and casts doubts on the true interpretation that should be given to negative signs obtained in 
other papers that use contemporary capital ratios. 
                                                                          
16. Some papers in the literature use the contemporaneous capital ratio as such or before loan loss reserves, but after 
retained earnings to test for capital management. 
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6 Regulatory policy lessons 
The first lesson is for accounting rule setters and bank supervisors. It seems that despite the 
set of very detailed rules governing provisioning in Spain, in sharp contrast with the discretion 
in many other countries, managers have had discretion to adjust its level as a function of the 
level of income. Thus, very detailed rules for loan loss provisions do not seem to deter banks 
from using them as a discretionary device to moderate earnings volatility, similarly to the 
empirical evidence in countries with accounting frameworks more principles-oriented. 
Therefore, if the discretion by bank managers is a concern for banking supervisors, the only 
deterrent might be detailed disclosure, not detailed rules for setting aside provisions. The 
former might allow investors and bank analysts to estimate profits and capital of banks far 
better than relying in the information provided by managers. In other words, reliance in 
principles might be the only option left for accounting standards. However, detailed disclosure 
might be useful in curtailing managers’ discretion, which inevitably seems to follow principles. 
In that sense, the adoption by the European Union of IFRS/IAS is an step forward in 
the direction of more principles-oriented accounting frameworks. Moreover, the Basel II 
devotes a lot of attention to disclosure requirements by banks, in particular, regarding detailed 
information on loan loss provisioning policies, internal models and expected loss calculations 
(Pillar 3 of the new capital accord). Transparency, instead of detailed rules or curtailing 
definitions, seems to be the key stone to assessing the financial strength of a bank and the 
way to effectively monitor bank managers’ discretion. 
Secondly, banks seem to make decisions on loan loss provisions independent 
of capital decisions. The lack of an empirical relationship (substitution) between both 
variables is consistent with the presumption that banks set capital levels to cover unexpected 
losses (UL) while provisions are set to cover for the expected ones (EL). Definitions of 
regulatory capital consistent with the observed behaviour of banks should split the role 
of loan loss provisions and capital in terms of EL and UL coverage. In fact, if the Spanish 
experience can be extrapolated to other countries, banks are expected to easily adapt 
to Basel II proposal to, essentially, use capital for UL and total loan loss provisions for EL. 
If there were substitution between capital and provisions or, alternatively, if banks considered 
both items as equivalents, then there would be no much interest in having separate 
requirements for expected and unexpected losses since an increase in capital might 
be balanced by a decline in loan loss provisions. However, if the opposite is true, as it 
has been proven for Spanish deposit institutions, then supervisors should make sure 
that both losses are properly covered, one with loan loss provisions and the other 
with capital. In fact, Basel II deletes any shortfall in the coverage of EL through provisions from 
capital, as explained in section 2. 
Accounting rule setters intend to avoid provisioning of unrealised losses since 
they focus on the annual profit or loss. On the other hand, banking regulators tend to 
regard capital buffers and provisioning of future losses as devices that might be useful 
to reinforce the solvency of banks and, therefore, contribute to financial stability17. 
The experience of the Spanish banking system shows that banks do use loan loss provisions 
to cover only EL (i. e. no interaction with capital). Therefore, the remaining issue is that the 
                                                                          
17. Wall and Koch (2000) point out the different views that accounting authorities and market regulators on the one side 
and bank supervisors on the other side hold on this issue. 
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accounting framework should allow for the full coverage of EL through loan loss provisions. 
If there is a maximum amount of those that can be set aside, banks will have to set aside 
more capital to cover the deficit. Although the latest Basel II proposal allows for that, it would 
be desirable that the accounting framework allowed for a more flexible response. 
Thirdly, the cyclical profile of loan loss provisions is a matter of concern for many 
banking supervisors targeting a safe and sound banking system. If provisions focus only on 
realised losses, without taking into account expected losses lurking in credit portfolios and 
waiting for the next recession to show up, then banking fragility might increase. A dynamic 
provision, based on expected losses or incurred, at a portfolio level, but not yet individually 
identified losses (i. e. latent or inherent losses), may be a way to keep at bay the former 
concerns18. 
Finally, from a prudential perspective, there are good arguments to defend the 
coverage of expected losses through loan loss provisions, as they are assumed by banks, 
and not to wait until losses are realised to cover them (either with specific provisions or out of 
the capital buffer). Does this pose a threat to transparency? The answer is no. The dynamic 
or statistical provision in Spain is a good example for that. It has stringent disclosure 
requirements so that investors and financial analysts can “undue” its impact on the profit and 
loss account. Banks are required to disclose the year amount of the statistical provision as 
well as the amount of the statistical reserve accumulated along time. Therefore, it is possible 
to have a prudential device, which is, at the same time, transparent. Thus, banking regulators 
should work closely with accounting rule setters and market supervisors in order to find 
a reasonable compromise between instruments that enhance banking stability without 
hampering transparency and investors’ information. Moreover, we have provided empirical 
evidence that the introduction of the statistical provision decreases the smoothing purposes 
of general and specific provision decisions of Spanish banks. Banks’ concern for smoothing 
earnings over time continues under the new regulatory situation but with the important 
difference that the statistical provision is a transparent smoothing device while the smoothing 
performed before was all opaque to unsophisticated analysts. 
                                                                          
18. Jiménez and Saurina (2006) contain a practical proposal, as well as the rational for it. Benston and 
Wall (2004 and 2005) argue that reported net income may be biased if a bank is experiencing rapid credit growth 
in loans that might go bad not before several years. In that case, the recognition of some of the interest payments 
should be deferred until it can be matched against the related credit risk. 
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7 Conclusions 
The present paper has tested for capital management and income smoothing among Spanish 
banks in order to draw some lessons for accounting rule setters and banking regulators 
regarding current changes of the accounting framework (i. e. introduction of IFRS/IAS in 
Europe) and Basel II framework. The null hypotheses to be tested have been derived from 
a detailed analysis of the reduced model that describes the behavior of banks when 
they manage profits and capital. The analysis has proven useful to identify the costs and 
benefits of income smoothing under different regulatory regimes on whether loan loss 
provisions should be part of regulatory capital or not. Second, it has proven to be a useful 
guide when it comes to specify the empirical models that give the results of the tests. 
Spain offers a unique environment to test income smoothing and capital 
management practices, compared with many other countries such as US, since there have 
been very detailed rules to set aside loan loss provisions and general loan loss provisions 
have not been counted as tier 2 capital. Moreover, changes in the regulatory environment 
such as the introduction in year 2000 of the statistical provision, that it is by itself an income 
smoothing device, should induce banks to reduce other, more costly, smoothing practices. 
Using panel data econometric methodology, we find clear evidence of income 
smoothing through general and specific loan loss provisions, but no capital management, 
among Spanish banks. The empirical evidence is also consistent with the prediction that 
after the statistical provision is in place Spanish banks will reduce the importance of other 
loan loss provisions, specific and general, to smooth income. The absence of capital 
management suggests that banks follow the pattern of covering EL with provisions and UL 
with capital. Thus, the final version of the Basel II framework can be expected to receive the 
endorsement of future banking practice from countries that in the past have been subject to 
different capital regulations. However, a very detailed set of loan loss provision rules does not 
prevent managers from decreasing earnings volatility. The other lesson from the Spanish 
experience is that transparent smoothing devices, such as the countercyclical statistical 
provision, induce banks to reduce other, opaque, smoothing practices. 
Some important lessons can be extracted from the former results. First of all, in the 
debate among accountants between principles versus detailed rules, the balance seems to tilt 
in favor of the former since the latter do not avoid managers’ discretion. That result enhances 
the value and the need of detailed disclosure. 
Moreover, supervisors will have to make sure that loan loss provisions properly 
cover expected losses and that capital is used for the unexpected ones, once the new capital 
framework is in place. Shortages of any of them will have to be properly addressed. 
That being the case, from a prudential point of view it is important to have a coherent 
accounting framework for banks that effectively allows loan loss provisions to fully cover 
expected losses. Dialog between accountants and banking supervisors might consider the 
parallelism between expected losses and losses incurred at a portfolio level, although not yet 
individually identified. The paper also confirms the pro-cyclical behavior of loan loss 
provisions. 
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In terms of banking stability, the paper offers some evidence that the final proposal 
of the BCBS regarding regulatory capital definition is not going to disrupt the incentives 
banks have to properly set aside loan loss provisions and capital to cover losses. However, 
it points towards the need for an open dialogue with accountants as well as the reinforcement 
of disclosure requirements to enhance bank transparency and monitoring by investors of 
bank manager’s behavior and incentives. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics and definition of the variables used in the empirical 
analysis 
 
Sample period: 1986-2002 (annual data). 
Sample size: 1449 observations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CPLL: ratio of total net specific and general loan loss provisions over total assets. 
NPL: ratio of doubtful assets over total assets. 
IBOL: general index of the Madrid Stock Exchange. 
LTA: ratio of total loans over total assets. 
GDPG: GDP growth. 
CAP: total capital ratio (regulatory capital over risk-weighted assets). 
CAPT1: Tier 1 ratio (Tier 1 capital over risk-weighted assets). 
BUF: capital buffer (the relative excess of capital hold by the bank over the minimum 
regulatory requirements). 
NOI: ratio of net income before provisions, extraordinary items and taxes over total assets. 
ABS (NOIit-NOIi): absolute value of the difference between the net operating income of bank 
i in period t and the average net operating income of bank i over the period. 
SIZE: log of total assets. 
Mean
Standard
Deviation Minimum Maximun
CPLL 0.40 0.42 -1.12 3.56
NPL 1.99 1.46 0.00 12.62
IBOL 442 264 208 1,012
LTA 52.65 12.02 10.98 98.95
GDPG 3.29 1.59 -1.03 5.55
CAP 11.27 3.34 1.87 47.58
CAPT1 10.01 3.52 1.30 47.58
BUF 40.86 41.72 -76.60 494.75
NOI 1.42 0.81 -4.77 5.65
ABS(NOI it -NOI i ) 0.40 0.39 0.00 5.61
SIZE 14.48 1.59 10.01 19.73
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Table 2. Estimation of the model of determinants of loan loss provisions charged by 
Spanish banks 
 
Dependent variable: CPLLit 
Estimation method: GMM, equation in first differences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 – Variables as defined in Table 1. 
 – m1 and m2 stand for first- and second-order residual autocorrelation, based on estimates of the 
residuals in first differences. 
 – IBOL, GDPG and  SIZE are considered exogenous. 
 -Instruments for the endogenous variables: GMM with lags 2 to 3 for NPL, LTA and CAP. NOI, 
NOI*REG00  and ABS(NOIit-NOIi) are instrumented with lag 2. All instruments selected as in DPD [Arellano 
and Bond (1991)]. 
–***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. P-values in brackets. 
 Explanatory
variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
NPL it 0.127*** 0.116*** 0.129*** 0.124*** 0.125***
(0.000)*** (0.003)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
IBOL it -0.000***   -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
         (0.111)*** (0.116)***  (0.109)*** (0.134)*** (0.180)***
LTA it 0.008***  0.012***  0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007***
 (0.013)***   (0.013)***   (0.011)*** (0.026)*** (0.014)***
GDPG it -0.042*** -0.047*** -0.042*** -0.046*** -0.045***
  (0.030)***  (0.029)*** (0.030)*** (0.025)*** (0.019)***
CAP it-1    -0.008***    -0.006***     --     -- -0.007***
     (0.345)***      (0.652)*** (0.424)***
CAPT1 it-1      --      --   -0.006***     --     --
    (0.569)***
BUF  it-1      --      --     -- -0.001***     --
 (0.185)***
NOI  it 0.169*** 0.166*** 0.170*** 0.142*** 0.159***
  (0.008)***  (0.022)*** (0.009)***  (0.026)***  (0.015)***
NOI it *REG00 -0.094***      -- -0.092*** -0.098*** -0.106***
  (0.005)***  (0.008)*** (0.008)***  (0.002)***
ABS(NOI  it -NOI i )      --      --     --     -- 0.103***
 (0.140)***
SIZE  it     -0.068*** -0.040*** -0.070*** -0.072*** -0.063***
      (0.494)***   (0.742)***  (0.489)*** (0.495)***  (0.521)***
m1 -3.440*** -2.986*** -3.422***     -3.486*** -3.341***
(0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)***  (0.000)***  (0.001)***
m2 -1.176*** -1.198*** -1.187*** -1.122*** -0.904***
  (0.240)***  (0.231)*** (0.235)*** (0.262)*** (0.366)***
Sargan test 87.98*** 89.03*** 84.86*** 88.53*** 89.22***
(0.279)*** (0.333)*** (0.363)*** (0.266)*** (0.249)***
Period 1989-2002 1989-1999 1989-2002 1989-2002 1989-2002
Nº Obs. 1029 829 1029 1029 1029
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Table 3. Robustness analysis for the estimation of determinants of loan loss 
provisions charged by Spanish banks 
 
Dependent variable: CPLLit 
Estimation method: GMM in first differences models 1 and 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 – Variables are defined in Table 1. 
 – m1 and m2 stand for first- and second-order residual autocorrelation tests, based on estimates of the 
residuals in first differences. 
– IBOL, GDPG, and SIZE are considered exogenous. 
– Instruments for the endogenous variables: GMM with lags 2 to 3 for CAP, CPLLit-1, NPL and LTA. NOI 
and NOI*REG00 are instrumented with lag 2. All instruments selected as in DPD [Arellano and Bond 
(1991)]. 
– ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. P-values in brackets. 
 
Explanatory
variables Model 1 Model 2
CPLL it-1 0.183***     --
(0.000)***
NPL it 0.113*** 0.124***
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
IBOL it -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.210)*** (0.152)***
LTA it 0.010*** 0.008***
(0.000)*** (0.014)***
GDPG it -0.033*** -0.048***
(0.077)*** (0.013)***
CAP it-1 -0.011***     --
(0.198)***
CAP it     -- -0.021***
(0.016)***
NOI  it 0.259*** 0.158***
(0.003)*** (0.013)***
NOI  it *REG00 -0.098*** -0.111***
(0.003)*** (0.001)***
SIZE  it -0.019*** -0.072***
(0.849)*** (0.442)***
m1 -3.539*** -3.448***
(0.000)*** (0.001)***
m2 -0.101*** -1.027***
(0.919)*** (0.305)***
Sargan test 114.71*** 86.34***
(0.311)*** (0.322)***
Period 1989-2002 1989-2002
Nº Obs. 1029 1029
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